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PROFESSOR CHARLES SCHMITZ 
 
AUTHOR: 
Dr. Charles Schmitz is Professor of Geography, 
Globalization and Disciplines, and Economic Geography at 
Towson University where he has taught since 1999.  He is 
the President of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies.  
He is a scholar of Yemen, particularly its political 
economy, but also works on counterterrorism, international 
law, and other issues related to Yemen.  He has followed 
the Arab Spring in Yemen closely and has written many 
articles related to the Arab Spring.  
REMARKS: 
American foreign policy in the Middle East has 
many different objectives. The narrative that we often hear 
is that the United States (U.S.) supports dictatorships in the 
name of its national interests.  I would argue that U.S. 
policy, in the last twenty years, has shifted to some degree.  
The U.S. certainly does look after its interests.  For 
example, the U.S. supports Saudi Arabia which does not 
look anything like a democracy.  It does not support the 
political values of the United States.  The Saudis helped 
crush a democratic movement in Bahrain, yet the U.S. did 
not criticize Bahrain or Saudi Arabia.  In this case, U.S. 
supports the authoritarian monarchies in order to secure 
U.S. interests in the region.  This is the narrative that we 
often hear about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. State Department has 
put a lot of effort into supporting civil society organizations 
that push for democratization.  Many of the bloggers and 
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social media activists in the Middle East have been trained 
or supported by the U.S.; some of them through U.S. 
supported agencies and others indirectly.  In addition, the 
broader justification for the invasion of Iraq was to 
establish a democracy, not just to eliminate weapons of 
mass destruction.  This shift towards emphasizing 
democracy was a result of criticisms of the U.S. in the past 
about supporting dictatorships in the Middle East.  So U.S. 
policy and actions are sometimes quite contradictory. 
 
Professor Hiltermann did a nice job of laying out 
the parameters and forces that are driving the Arab Spring.  
I want to look at Yemen as a case study. 
 
What is the Arab Spring?  It is a good question and 
people are debating how to describe these events. They 
were initially called “youth rebellions,” or “youth 
revolutions.”  The uprisings have clearly brought a new 
political ethic to the Middle East.  The idea that people 
have to live under dictatorships is rejected.  People now in 
the Middle East understand that they can overcome 
authoritarianism and this is very powerful.  This has shifted 
to some extent the dynamic of politics within the countries 
of the Middle East. 
 
I think the best term I’ve seen is “rebellion” and not 
“revolution,” because we have yet to see what is going to 
happen.  I think the best case is Tunisia where you had a 
tradition of institutional integrity.  In other cases I am not 
so sure.  I’ll tell you a little bit about the Yemeni case.  In 
the Yemeni case, as Professor Hiltermann pointed out, 
there was a succession.  The president of the republic was 
trying to position his son to become the next president, 
which was widely rejected by people in Yemen.  The 
insistence of the President on grooming his son for the 
position was the lightning rod around which other 
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grievances such as the lack of economic development and, 
particularly, the lack of popular political participation—the 
ability of people to shape their political future—coalesced.  
Then, the Arab Spring in North Africa—the fall of Ben Ali 
[in Tunisia], the fall of Mubarak in Egypt—inspired the 
Yemeni youth and students outside the university set up a 
protest movement.  The President immediately backed 
down in response.  He said that there would be early 
elections.  He also stated, “I will not be a candidate nor will 
my son.”  Saleh got the message.  Things continued for a 
little while until, about two months into the demonstrations, 
security forces started shooting into the demonstrators.  At 
that point, the key enforcer in inner regime, Ali Muhsin al-
Ahmar, the general most known as the face of oppression 
as the person who put out fires, who fought many wars, in 
Yemen against the President’s enemies, split off and said 
he was going to protect the protesters from the government 
troops. 
 
Those of us who knew Yemen saw the wolf 
guarding the sheep, but the split in the elite was significant 
in the Yemeni case because it brought the President’s 
military power into check.  There now were two opposing 
military forces, with more or less equal power, and the 
country ground slowly into what could have been a civil 
war.  After General al-Ahmar split from the regime, the 
opposition parties rallied around him to become a 
significant force against the President.  There they sat for 
quite some time, with guns pointed at each other in the 
capital city ready to explode into a civil war.  So in Yemen, 
there was an initial rebellion, and a split in the political 
elite, that the opposition political forces within the country 
took advantage of.  Interestingly, the drive for international 
intervention in Yemen really came from the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, from Saudi Arabia, because Saudi 
Arabia’s relationship to Yemen is like the relationship of 
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the United States to Mexico.  The U.S. fears Mexican 
instability and the Saudis fear Yemeni instability.  The 
Saudis also fear a powerful Yemen.  They like a Yemen 
that is stable, but not too strong.  They felt that Yemen’s 
rebellion was getting out of control, so they negotiated an 
agreement between the elite, which the Yemenis are 
following right now.  They have a transitional two-year 
government, where half the government is composed of the 
old ruling party and half the government is opposition 
people.  They are trying to have a national dialogue after 
which they are going to write a new constitution, and have 
new elections.  The Gulf Cooperation Council rather than 
the United Nations (U.N.) brokered the agreement.  The 
U.N. initially had very little to do with the agreement.  The 
U.N. sent an observer, who, because of [his] own 
personality, has become very influential in the subsequent 
negotiations.  Now the U.N. is playing a prominent role in 
Yemen in negotiating the future, but the political force that 
really brought the Yemeni parties together was the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. 
 
Because of the split within the political elite in 
Yemen, centrifugal forces in Yemen are strong.   Yemeni 
society is quite diverse and people have the monopoly on 
the means of coercion.  Everybody is armed in Yemen.  
The central state does not have the ability to repress in any 
systematic way.  Some regions and groups in Yemen are 
now completely autonomous.  The fact that Yemen is so 
diverse and that everyone has the ability to break off and to 
negotiate on their own via military force, I think, has forced 
the Yemenis to try to think about the rules that will allow a 
political settlement amongst this diversity.  There is no one 
group in Yemen that can impose itself on everyone else.  
So, the Yemeni are beginning to think about 
institutionalizing political processes that will allow this 
diverse society with so many different interests, with no 
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one group that is able to dominate, to survive.  People are 
talking about institutionalization of diversity rather than 
dominance of one group or another.  This may be the 
beginning of the rule of law in Yemen, I’m hoping, as a 
result of the particular characteristics of the situation in 
Yemen.   
 
The last point I want to talk about is the U.S. 
position in Yemen.  Yemen for the United States is 
primarily a battleground against al-Qaeda.  Yemen is the 
“cutting-edge” of the U.S. counterterrorism policy in that 
the military and CIA are involved in the use of force far 
from any declared warzone.  The U.S. is not at war with 
Yemen yet the U.S. is using military means to assassinate 
people in Yemen.  This is a very controversial policy.  
Inside of Yemen, there is considerable blowback but the 
media coverage here in the U.S. misinterprets Yemeni 
opinion. People here argue that drones are driving people 
into the hand of al-Qaeda.  I don’t think that’s quite the 
case.  What is clear is that no one in Yemen likes the 
drones.  Everyone is against the drone policy and it is 
causing quite a bit of blowback against the U.S.—not 
driving people into al-Qaeda but against the U.S. and, in 
particular, over the issue of national sovereignty.  It makes 
the Yemenis feel as if they do not have control over their 
own territory and airspace.  People fear anything that flies 
above them.  It is quite an unsettling situation and it turns 
people against U.S. foreign policy in Yemen. 
 
Thank you.  
 
 
